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H
ousing construction has been a driving force
behind U.S. economic recoveries. On average,
residential construction has accounted for two-
thirds of the increase in final sales during cyclical
upturns (Perry and Schultze 1993). In the most
recent recovery, however, homebuilding activity
has been modest, accounting for less than a third of
the increase in final sales. With housing afforda-
bility at a twenty-year high, those in the industry
are puzzled and concerned by the lackluster
growth of home construction.
Why has the housing industry not boosted
the economy as much during this recovery?
Demographics would seem to be an important
part of the answer. The average annual increase
in the population aged 25 and over is projected to
fall from the 2.6 million experienced during the
1980s to 1.7 million in the 1990s. As growth in the
adult population slows, so will the demand for
new housing.
The purpose of this article is to measure the
importance of projected shifts in the size and age
distribution of the U.S. population for the rate of
growth in housing demand (that is, net housing
investment). We wish to give the reader a sense of
just how much and for how long the population
slowdown is likely to restrain housing demand.
The analysis runs through the first decade of the
next century and provides separate estimates for
single-family and multifamily housing.
Our results indicate that the contractionary
effects of the population slowdown are already
being felt in the housing industry and probably
have been at work since the latter part of the 1980s.
In our simulations, changes in the size and age
distribution of the population lower net housing
investment by 17 percent from the late 1980s
through the first half of the 1990s. Population
factors then reduce net investment an additional
22 percent from the mid-1990s through the first
half of the first decade of the next century before
turning favorable.
On a percentage basis, the effects of the
population slowdown are greatest in multifamily
building. Population shifts reduce net investment
in multifamily units by 60 percent from the late
1980s through the end of this century. Single-
family building is not spared, however. Population
factors decrease net investment in single-family
homes by one-third from the late 1980s through
the middle of the first decade of the next century.
Are the demographics inexorable? Is  it
possible that changes in immigration policy could
offset the slowdown in the native population? The
numbers show that to stave off a decline in new
home construction, immigration quotas would
have to be doubled, from the current limit of
700,000 people per year to around 1.5 million
per year.
We also investigate whether the effects of
the population slowdown could be reversed by
changes in cohabitation patterns. In the scenario
most favorable to housing investment, we assume
that high economic growth encourages substantial
new household formation and that baby boomers,
who in their younger years had less of a taste for
marriage than did their parents, continue to live as
single adults in relatively high proportions. The
implied changes in household formation have aFederal Reserve Bank of Dallas 18
strong effect on the mix of new housing demand,
greatly favoring multifamily investment. However,
these changes can only reduce the projected
decline in total net investment from 36 percent to
22 percent from the late 1980s through the early
part of the twenty-first century.
Population shifts may not be the only in-
fluence on housing demand over the next few
decades. Housing demand is also greatly affected
by interest rates and tax laws. But given what we
know about the size of the decline in births follow-
ing the end of the baby boom, demographics are
certain to play a major role in the future of the
U.S. housing industry. Any long-term assessment
of housing demand must begin with basic popula-
tion arithmetic.
Framework for analysis
To calculate the effect of demographic shifts
on housing demand, we use a method similar to
the one developed by Jaffee and Rosen (1979).
We begin with individual population projections
by age group and use historical headship rates to
estimate the household population by age of
household head and type of household (family or
nonfamily). Projections of housing demand by
type of home (single-family or multifamily) then
are developed by combining the estimates of
household population with historical propensities
to demand housing of a particular type by age
and type of household.
The computational framework is given
formally by
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where HSF and HMF are the stock demands for
single-family and multifamily housing in a given
year; Ks and Km are scale factors; POPi is the
number of people in age bracket i; fi is the likeli-
hood of a person of age i heading up a family
household (the family headship rate); ni is the
likelihood of a person of age i heading up a non-
family household (the nonfamily headship rate);
θfi is the likelihood that a family household headed
by a person of age i would occupy a single-family
home; and θni is the likelihood that a nonfamily
household with head of age i would occupy a
single-family home.
In our basic population analysis, all of the
terms in equations 1 and 2 are treated as constants,
except for the population data. We simply run the
population numbers through the equations to see
how much of an effect on housing investment we
should expect from population shifts alone.
To specify the equations, the scale factors Ks
and Km were chosen so that the two simulated
series on net investment would replicate, respec-
tively, the average value of new single-family and
new multifamily homes put in place during the
period 1970–89. The resulting values are Ks = 73.2
and Km = 45.0, both in thousands of 1982 dollars.
Values used for the remaining parameters are based
on 1980 data and are shown in Table 1. The head-
ship rates are Bureau of the Census estimates.
Following Census convention, family households
are either married couples or single-parent house-
holds with at least one child. Nonfamily house-
holds include singles and two or more unrelated
individuals sharing a residence. The propensities
to occupy single-family housing are from the
Current Population Survey.
Especially important to the analysis are the
terms in brackets in equations 1 and 2. These
terms represent the number of single-family and
multifamily housing units demanded per capita.
Their values are shown in the last two rows of
Table 1. Within the adult age categories, the most
significant variation in the numbers occurs between
the age groups 25–34 and 35–44. The frequency
of single-family home demand rises by a third and
that of multifamily demand falls by a little more
than a third as households move from one age
group to the next. These differences in per capita
housing demand play a significant role in our
analysis, because every member of the baby boom
generation passes between these age groups
sometime during the 1980s and 1990s.1
1 The baby boom generation refers to those born between the
years 1946 and 1964.Economic Review — First Quarter 1994 19
The effect of population shifts
on net housing investment
Equations 1 and 2 provide the analytical
framework for measuring the effect on housing
demand of shifts in the size and age distribution
of the population. To carry out the analysis, we
use population data for the period 1980–2010,
with data through 1990 being Census estimates of
actuals and data beyond 1990 being Census projec-
tions. The demographics have their most visible
impact on the rate of growth in housing demand,
or net housing investment. Thus, we show the
calculated path of net housing investment (Figure
1). To help smooth the series, the results are pre-
sented as annual averages over five-year periods.
The first point to notice is that the popula-
tion slowdown does not bring about an absolute
decline in housing demand. Net investment remains
positive throughout the forecast period. What the
demographics do is reduce the rate of growth in
housing demand. From the latter half of the 1980s
through the period 2000–04, total net housing
investment falls by 36 percent. On a percentage
basis, the population slowdown is most important
for multifamily building. Net investment in multi-
family units declines by 60 percent from the late
1980s through the late 1990s. The demographics
reduce single-family investment throughout the
1990s and into the first half of the first decade of
the next century. Net investment in single-family
homes falls by one-third over this period.
Table 2 details the results by age group. The
most significant patterns in the numbers relate to
the baby boom generation. Baby boomers enter
the 35–44 age group in the early 1980s, producing
a bulge in housing investment in that age bracket
through the mid-1990s. We can then follow the
bulge as the cohort matures. The bulge appears
in the 45–54 age bracket beginning in the early
1990s, and it reappears in the 55–64 group at the
turn of the century. The baby boomers also leave
their mark as they vacate an age bracket. Their
maturation is the reason for the absolute drop in
housing demand in the 25–34 age group during
the 1990s and in the 35–44 age group during the
first decade of the next century.
Also noticeable, although much less signifi-
Table 1
Anatomy of Per Capita Housing Demand in 1980
by Age Group and Type of Structure
Age of  householder
<25 25–34 35–44 45–54 55–64 ≥65
Headship rates, by type of household
Family (fi) .04 .36 .47 .47 .43 .34
Nonfamily (ni) .03 .11 .07 .08 .13 .29
Percent of households occupying
single-family homes, by type of household
Family (θfi) .55 .75 .86 .88 .89 .86
Nonfamily (θni) .31 .38 .46 .55 .63 .62
Single-family homes per capita
(fiθfi + ni θni) .03 .32 .43 .46 .46 .46
Multifamily housing units per capita
[fi (1–θfi) + ni (1–θni)] .04 .16 .10 .09 .10 .17Federal Reserve Bank of Dallas 20
cant in size, is the effect of the baby bust genera-
tion born in the Great Depression. The relatively
low number of births during the 1930s is the reason
for the low net investment numbers in the 55–64
age group during the period 1985–94 and in the
65-plus age group during the period 1995–2004.
Housing and immigration policy
Our prediction that net housing investment
will fall sharply over the next two decades is made
essentially on the basis of a projected decline in
the growth of the U.S. adult population. We can
be confident in our assumptions about the future
growth of the native population, because in a
forecast that goes out no more than twenty years,
the size of adult age groups can be estimated
from known birth rates. The major risk in the
population forecast is immigration. In this section
we give the reader a sense of how much more
open U.S. immigration policy would have to be if
a slowdown in housing demand is to be avoided.
To quantify the impact of alternative immi-
gration policies, we use the same algebraic frame-
work as in the previous section but modify the
population numbers to reflect an increased flow of
immigrants. In our simulations, an infusion of new
immigrants occurs each year beginning in 1991
and continuing throughout the forecast period.
Upon arrival, these new immigrants are distributed
across age groups in the same way as legal immi-
grants who were admitted into the United States
between 1980 and 1988. Except for age, immi-
grants are identical to natives.2
The increase in immigration allowed for in
the simulations is something over and above the
immigration assumed by the Census Bureau in its
projections. In the Census projections we used for
our base case, net immigration was assumed to
occur at a rate of about 500,000 people per year.
These projections were made before the Immigra-
tion Act of 1990, which raised legal immigrant
quotas to about 700,000 per year. We consider
three alternatives to our base case. The first pro-
vides for an increase in flows of 200,000 immi-
grants per year. This case gives us a rough idea
of how important the 1990 reforms will be to the
Figure 1
Net Housing Investment by Type of Structure:
Simulated Series Based on Shifts in the Size
and Age Distribution of the U.S. Population
(Five-Year Averages of Annual Rates)
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2 There are, of course, significant differences between immi-
grants and natives. Most crucial for housing demand is that
immigrants on average earn less income, even after a long
assimilation period (see Borjas 1990). Thus, our simula-
tions probably overstate the impact of new immigrants on
housing demand.
Figure 2
Housing and Immigration Policy
(Simulated Net Investment)
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housing industry. In our second case, immigrant
flows are raised by 500,000 people per year. In a
final scenario we assume immigration quotas are
increased by 1 million per year.
The results are shown in Figure 2. As one
would expect, housing investment rises uniformly
with each successive increase in the quota limit.
The 1990 reforms are seen to have a modest effect
on housing investment. In the base case, net resi-
dential investment drops by 33 percent from the
late 1980s through the end of the first decade of
the twenty-first century. In the scenario with 1990
reforms, investment still falls by 26 percent. To
avoid a decline in net housing investment, immi-
gration quotas have to be raised to 1.5 million per
year, more than double the amount under current
policy.
Housing and headship rates
In projecting housing demand from demo-
graphic data, it is necessary to know not only how
many people there are but how they group them-
selves into households. Over the past two decades,
there has been a growing trend toward single-
adult households. Rising divorce rates, delayed
marriages, and greater societal acceptance of
singleness have contributed to this trend. Because
single adults have a higher propensity to rent
apartments than do families, we would expect
that the trend toward singleness has tilted the
demand for housing away from single-family and
toward multifamily units. With a greater number
of households being formed from a given popula-
tion, the overall level of housing demand may
also have been raised.
The purpose of this section is to determine
the importance of recent and possible future
changes in cohabitation patterns for housing in-
vestment. We once again use equations 1 and 2,
but now we allow headship rates to change over
time. For the years 1980 through 1990 we use
Census estimates of actual headship rates. For the
years 1991 through 2010, we consider a range of
Table 2
Effect of Population Shifts on Net Housing Investment by Type of Structure
and Age of Householder, 1980–2009
(Average Annual Rates, in Billions of 1982 Dollars)
Age of householder
<25 25–34 35–44 45–54 55–64 ≥65 Total
Change in demand for
single-family homes
1980–84 –1.1 21.4 38.0 –1.1 3.9 19.2 80.4
1985–89 –.1 7.8 38.4 19.4 –6.6 20.5 79.5
1990–94 .1 –13.8 28.2 39.1 –.3 15.0 68.3
1995–99 .2 –17.7 10.0 39.9 19.1 7.5 59.1
2000–04 .0 –5.3 –18.8 29.6 38.0 9.5 52.8
2005–09 –.1 7.3 –23.9 10.7 38.3 20.9 53.3
Change in demand for
multifamily housing
1980–84 –.1 6.6 5.6 –.1 .5 4.3 16.7
1985–89 –.1 2.4 5.7 2.4 –.8 4.5 14.1
1990–94 .0 –4.3 4.1 4.9 .0 3.2 8.0
1995–99 .0 –5.5 1.5 5.0 2.5 1.6 5.2
2000–04 .0 –1.6 –2.7 3.6 5.0 2.1 6.4
2005–09 .0 2.2 –3.5 1.3 5.0 4.6 9.5Federal Reserve Bank of Dallas 22
possible values based on the work of Hendershott
(1988). Hendershott’s projections run from 1990
through the year 2000. We use these projections
to extend the actual headship rates to 2000. For
the first decade of the twenty-first century, we
assume that the trends over the previous ten years
continue but at only one-half the rate.
From the group of alternative scenarios
suggested by Hendershott, we chose two that
produce a wide range of possible outcomes for
housing investment.3 In the scenario we label
“high,” the projected headship rates are based
on the assumption that economic growth will be
high and that baby boomers will continue to have
a strong preference for living as single adults,
even as they grow older. In the “low” scenario,
income growth is assumed to be low and there is
a less rapid decline in the married-couple share
of households.4
The results of the simulations involving
changing headship rates are shown in Figures 3
through 5. For comparison, we also present the
base case. Beginning with actuals, the changes in
headship rates that occurred during the 1980s
appear to have altered the mix of housing invest-
ment but not the total amount. Comparing the
base case with the series simulated from actual
headship rates, net investment in multifamily
homes is raised 25 percent by the changes in
headship rates. This rise is offset by a comparable
absolute decline in single-family investment, how-
ever, so that total net residential investment is
essentially unchanged.
Turning to the projections, the results from
the “low” scenario are similar to those for the
1980s. The projected changes in headship rates
have a large percentage effect on multifamily
investment, but only a small effect on total invest-
ment. The total investment series with changing
headship rates is, over the entire forecast period,
only 5 percent higher than the base case series.
The changes in headship rates assumed in
the “high” scenario have a more sizeable impact
on housing investment. Once again the results are
most dramatic in multifamily investment. The
projected changes in headship rates almost double
the average annual rate of multifamily investment.
Because of substantial increases in total headship
rates in this scenario, single-family investment is
also raised, by an average of 11 percent over the
forecast period. In total, net housing investment is
19 percent higher because of the projected changes
in headship rates. These gains are not sufficient,
however, to offset the contractionary effects of the
population slowdown. Total net housing invest-
ment continues to fall in this scenario.
Long-run forecasts of multifamily building
clearly must factor in the possibility of a continued
trend toward single-adult households. Not to do
so would understate investment by one-quarter or
Figure 3
Housing and Headship Rates: Alternative
Scenarios Involving Changing Patterns
of Cohabitation (Simulated Net Investment)
All Homes












3 In addition to the Hendershott scenarios, we considered an
alternative forecast using projected headship rates from the
Bureau of the Census. The results using these projections
fell between the other two scenarios. Thus, we did not
include these results in the text.
4 Hendershott projects total headship rates (family plus
nonfamily) on the basis of assumptions about future eco-
nomic conditions. The relationships are consistent with the
theory that privacy is a normal good. More households will
be formed from a given population the greater the ability of
the population to afford housing. The breakdown of total
headship rates by type of family depends upon assump-
tions about future tastes for marriage.Economic Review — First Quarter 1994 23
more. Future changes in cohabitation patterns are
probably less crucial in the overall outlook for
residential construction. We obtained numerically
significant results for total housing investment
only after making extremely aggressive assump-
tions about future rates of household formation.
Even in this case, total residential investment is
projected to fall 22 percent from the late 1980s
through the period 2000–04.
Implications
Our analysis has focused on the rate of
growth in housing demand, or net housing invest-
ment. We chose to present our results in this way
because shifts in the size and age-mix of the
population speak more directly to this variable
than to any other. Those interested in the future
of the housing industry, on the other hand, are
probably more concerned with what the popula-
tion slowdown will mean for construction jobs
and home prices. We conclude with a discussion
of what our results suggest will happen to these
variables. In our discussion, we use results from
the base-case simulations, with fixed headship
rates. This represents something of a worst-case
scenario. But absent a major liberalization of
immigration policy or rapid economic growth, it
may not be far off the mark.
To assess the outlook for residential con-
struction employment, we need to think in terms
of gross investment rather than net investment.
That is, we need to consider the construction that
is needed to maintain and replace worn out
buildings as well as that required to provide for a
growing household population. To obtain estimates
of gross housing investment, we assume that the
stock of single-family homes depreciates at an
annual rate of 2.25 percent and that apartments
depreciate at an annual rate of 4 percent. Gross
investment, then, is the sum of net investment
plus what is needed to offset depreciation. In
Figure 6 we show the resulting series on gross
residential investment, along with the baseline
series on net housing investment. To make com-
parisons easy, we index each series to equal 100
over the period 1980–84.
The population slowdown will bring about a
sharp reduction in net housing investment but no
significant change in gross investment. Thus, the
homebuilding industry need not contract abso-
lutely. There will be little if any job growth, how-
ever, and the industry is certain to play a smaller
role in the economy. The top line in Figure 6
shows how much gross investment would have to
rise to keep pace with historical and projected
growth in the U.S. labor force. The width of the
gap between this line and the line on gross housing
Figure 4
Housing and Headship Rates (Continued)
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Figure 5
Housing and Headship Rates (Continued)
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investment indicates the degree to which demo-
graphic changes will reduce the share of residen-
tial construction in national employment. With
gross investment being essentially flat and the
labor force growing about 50 percent from the
early 1980s through the year 2010, housing’s share
of employment is reduced by one-third.
Turning to home prices, it is useful to think of
the price of a home as reflecting two components:
the price of the land and the price of the struc-
ture. Given a certain fixity in the supply of land
suitable for residential development, land prices
will move with the stock demand for housing—
rising as housing demand rises and falling as
housing demand falls. Our analysis shows that
future demographic shifts will reduce the rate of
growth in housing demand but not its absolute
level. Housing demand will continue to rise over
the foreseeable future. There is, then, no apparent
reason for residential land prices to be weakened
by the population slowdown. It is always possible
that real estate markets have failed to appreciate
the extent of the slowdown in housing demand,
having capitalized excessively any future appre-
ciation in land values and having set themselves
up for a price correction. But this would be a
matter of some speculation and certainly not a
necessary consequence of the demographics.
With a rising supply price for new home
construction, the price of residential structures will
vary directly with the rate of gross investment
demand. How much prices would fall in response
to a decline in investment demand depends on
the size of the drop in demand and the price
elasticity of supply of new structures. From the
work of Muth (1983), it is widely believed that the
supply of new homes is highly elastic in the long
run, ensuring a limited price adjustment whatever
the shift in demand. Our analysis further suggests
that the shift in demand is not likely to be large in
the first place. In our simulations, the demograph-
ics halt the growth of gross housing investment,
but they do not reduce it.
Considering both land and structures, it is
difficult to see in the population numbers a com-
pelling reason for average home prices to fall.
Thus, we strongly disagree with the conclusion of
Mankiw and Weil (1989) that home prices may fall
by half over the next two decades because of the
demographic slowdown. There is more potential,
we believe, for relative price adjustments to take
place between different types of homes. The stock
demand for housing will fall sharply for house-
holds in the age group 25–34 during the 1990s
and for those aged 35–44 during the first decade
of the next century. Prices of homes specialized to
suit people in these age brackets (starter homes,
homes for families with young children) may well
weaken. On the other hand, the demographics
will serve to strengthen the prices of homes that
are popular with older adults who have graduated
their children, the so-called empty nesters.
The population slowdown is an important
economic and social event with the potential to
substantially reduce the importance of homebuild-
ing in the economy and to alter the prices of some
single-family homes. However, these changes will
be consumer driven and so should not be resisted.
The changes also will take decades to play out
and are relatively easy to forecast. They would not
seem to pose a significant threat to macroeconomic
stability. Policymakers need to be well-informed
about the extent of the change in the housing
industry that can be expected from the demo-
graphics to avoid overstimulating the economy
and causing undue delay in the process of struc-
tural change.
Figure 6
Gross Investment Needed to Maintain
Housing’s Share of Employment
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